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*Object theory:  
its development in Austrian logic and  
philosophy of 19th century.*

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# Introduction

- “German”. Pure (formal) logic investigates the forms of thought; it deals with nothing.
  - “English”. The principal subject of logic is reasoning; it deals with language.
  - “Austrian”. Logic is the theory of science; it deals with objects.
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# Bernard Bolzano (1781 – 1848)

Intuition [Anschauung] does not constitute the basis of mathematical knowledge. Mathematics (geometry as well as mathematical analysis) consists of “conceptual truths”, and, consequently, it is analytical knowledge.

## Wissenschaftslehre (1837)

Logic considers concepts, propositions and truths in itself [an sich]

Logic is formal science, but it is due to the fact that it considers the *forms of “propositions-in-itself”*, not the *forms of thought*.

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Bernard Bolzano (1781 – 1848)

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# Johan. F. Herbart (1776-1841)

Professor in Königsberg (1809-33), Göttingen (1833-41)

- **Hauptpunkte der Logik** (1807)
- **Lehrbuch zur Einleitung in die Philosophie** (1813)

Philosophy is reworking [bearbeitung] of concepts; Logics is the first level of that reworking, its task is to make concepts clear and distinct.

Logic deals with representations. But it does not deal with the act of representing: thus neither with the way and manner by means of which we arrive at them, nor with the mental states to which we are moved by this". It is concerned only with this, "***what is represented***"

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## J.F.Herbart (1776-1841)

- Concepts are neither real objects nor actual acts of thinking
  - Thinking is just a mediator, a kind of cart which brings concepts into one place
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# Robert Zimmerman (1824-1898)

Professor in Prague (since 1852), Wien (since 1861)

- Retranslator of Bolzanism in the school of Brentano?
  - The founder of object theory?
  - 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. of *Formal Logik*: distinction of content and object. Curiously, that content has two parameters: form and matter.  $F(a, b, c, \dots)$
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# Robert Zimmerman (1824-1898)

Formal logic (1853 – 1<sup>st</sup> ed., 1860 – 2<sup>nd</sup> ed.)

- Bolzano: classification of the representations-in-itself.
  - Zimmerman: classification of the objects of representation.
  - Objectual and objectless
  - Actual and non-actual
  - Objectless: contingently objectless and objectless in general.
  - Non-actual: possible and impossible.
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# One example

- Alois Riehl (1844-1924)

Graduated from Graz University in 1865.

The form of science is a subject of special science, and that science is logic.

In his *Der philosophische Kritizismus...* (1876) he defined logic as “a theory of universal incontradictory relationships between objects in general”

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# Franz Brentano (1838-1917)

Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (1874)

Brentano rejected Bolzanian “essences”-in-itself. He allowed only intentional act and intentional object. Accordingly,

- Act of representation
  - Act of judgment, i.e. of adopting either rejecting the object represented
-  Every judgment is judgement of existence or of non-existence of an object.
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# Franz Brentano (1838-1917)

- (I) Some  $S$  are  $P$                       There is an  $S$  which is  $P$
  - (E) No  $S$  is  $P$                               There is no  $S$  which is  $P$
  - (O) Some  $S$  are not  $P$                     There is an  $S$  which is a non- $P$
  - (A) All  $S$  are  $P$                             There is no  $S$  which is a non- $P$
  
  - After Brentanian reduction we have two forms of judgments:
    - 1) affirmative (= particular of traditional logic)
    - 2) negative (= general of traditional logic)
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# Alois Höffler (1853-1920)

**Logik** (1<sup>st</sup> part of *philosophische Propädeutik*), 1890.

- The object of thought (whether representation or judgment) should in no way be identified with its content.
  - Representations with different contents may refer to the same object.
  - One should distinct thoroughly:
  - 1. Things 2. Representations 3. Names
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# Benno Kerry (1858-1889)

- **Über Anschauung und ihre psychische Verarbeitung, 8 art. (1885-1889)**

G.Frege is often mentioned in arts. 2 and 3; art. 4 is completely devoted to the critical analysis of Frege's ideas

The distinction of the "Content of the concept" and the "Object of the concept" is extended on mathematical concepts

Frege's paper "Über Begriff und Gegenstand" (1891) was a response to one of Kerry's remark.

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# G.Frege and B.Kerry

- Was it contingent that Frege split his “judgeable content” on “Sinn” and “Bedeutung” *after* learning the work of Kerry?
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